GREATER SERBIA IS DEAD

New Statesman & Society leader, 11 August 1995

The Croat victory in the Krajina shows that the Serbs are not invincible – but it is not necessarily good news for Bosnia
The past week has seen the most significant turn­ing point in the war in former Yugoslavia since it began in 1991. On that, everyone agrees, regard­less of political persuasion. For the first time, the forces of Serb nationalism have suffered an overwhelm­ing – in fact, catastrophic – military defeat, and have been forced to cede territory seized and “ethnically cleansed” in the first couple of years of the conflict.
The first, obvious lesson of the successful Croatian assault that took the Krajina, overthrew the rebel Serb nationalist regime in Knin and relieved the besieged Bosnian government enclave of Bihac, is that the Serbs are far from invincible on the battlefield. They can be forced to yield their conquests. Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in the 19805 promising a Greater Serbia stretching from the Macedonian border with Greece to the Adriatic coast. His militarist dream motivated the Serb nationalist land-grab in Croatia and then Bosnia when the Croats and Bosnians decided to secede from Yugoslavia rather than submit to his hegemony. Now it is shattered.
It is hardly surprising that the first response to the news of the Croatian victory among the Bosnians fight­ing Serb nationalist occupation of their own country was unalloyed glee. Of course, the Krajina Serb forces were not as large or as well-equipped as those of the Bosnian Serbs, and it is relatively easy to reinforce the Bosnian Serbs from Serbia proper, particularly in eastern Bosnia. It is unlikely to be as easy to crush the Bosnian Serb army as it was to crush its Krajina counterpart.
Nevertheless, just weeks after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa to the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnians appeared, in the immediate aftermath of the Croatian victory, to have grounds for optimism. With Serb morale at an all-time low, the Bosnian Serb leadership apparently irrevocably divided and Bihac relieved, it seemed that the military prospects of the Bosnian government – and therefore the prospects of restoring a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, liberal society to the whole of Bosnia – were rosier than they had been since the beginning of the war.
As the dust has settled, however, the picture has begun to look more complex and rather less optimistic. Most obviously, almost the entire Serbian population of the Krajina – estimates range up to 200,000 people – have decided to flee rather than find out whether the Croats will keep their promises of democratic rights and reli­gious tolerance. No matter that it appears, on the scanty available evidence, that the Croat army did not engage in “ethnic cleansing” as practised by Serb nationalists in Bosnia – the result is a giant refugee crisis, accurately described by a United Nations High Commission for Refugees spokesperson as “a major humanitarian cata­strophe”. Croatia’s insistence that it will welcome the return of Serb Croat citizens and will guarantee the rights of all who are not war criminals will reassure only a handful of those who have left. Even at this early stage, it seems likely that many Krajina Serbs will become per­manent exiles in Serb-occupied Bosnia, adopting a stance of resentful ultra-nationalism.
Then there is the whole question of the intentions of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman now that he has taken the Krajina. Is there an understanding with Milo­sevic, formal or informal, for the latter to sit back and watch the Croats defeat the Krajina Serbs in return for Tudjman allowing the Serbs to keep Eastern Slavonia? More important, is there a deal to carve up Bosnia between Belgrade and Zagreb? So far, the evidence for a Tudjman-Milosevic pact is weak and circumstantial: Tudjman’s scribblings on the back of a menu, Milose­vic’s inaction last weekend and his attempt to supplant Radovan Karadzic with Ratko Mladic as Bosnian Serb leader. The evidence against, on the other hand, is no stronger: veiled Croatian government threats to take Eastern Slavonia by force, Tudjman’s public appearance with his ally president Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, the despatch of Serbian tanks in an easterly direction.
Obviously, a deal is a worse prospect for the Bosnians than no deal – but even in the absence of one there is a real danger that the Sarajevo government will now find itself even more at the mercy of Zagreb’s whims than it has been so far. Control of supply routes to Bosnia has long been used by the Croats to ensure that the Bosnian government has only the military capacity that they want it to have. With Tudjman successful in his primary aim of taking the Krajina, the Bosnians could find all too easily that their supply of arms is effectively cut off. More than ever, it is imperative that the arms embargo on the Bosn­ian government is lifted.

WHO CARES?

New Statesman & Society, 7 July 1995

John Major has claimed a conclusive victory in being re-elected to the Tory leadership – despite failing to get the backing of more than a third of his party. But how much does it matter who leads the Tories? Not a lot, say Paul Anderson and Steve Platt. Any leader would face broadly the same problems – and go for broadly the same ‘solutions’

Whoever they’d voted for, the Tories would still be in. For all the sound and fury in the press and on television, the underlying mood in the country towards the Conservative Party leadership elec­tion is “Who cares ?” The parliamentary excitement that Simon Hoggart, writing in the Guardian, described as “Glastonbury for the politi­cal classes”  – “they will endure any priva­tion, any discomfort and loss of sleep just to say they were there”  – was received with about as much enthusiasm in the nation at large as might have been conjured up at the Glastonbury music festival for a final-night set by a Young Conservatives’ skiffle band.

The reason is partly the general disaf­fection with politics  – and particularly parliamentary politics  – that is currently abroad throughout the democratic world. But it is also, more importantly, the fact that the Conservatives’ political project has run out of steam; and no amount of tinkering with the personnel who are meant to be running the locomotive will get it going again.

The Tories have opted to stick with John Major  – but none of the leadership options aired in the three years since the Black Wednesday debacle left the Tories economic credibility in shreds, let alone during the leadership election, would have made a blind bit of difference. Every conceivable alternative to Major  – a left-wing Tory like Kenneth Clarke, a right-winger like John Redwood or Michael Portillo, or a populist like Michael Heseltine  – would get the same answer from the electorate: we’ve found you out, you got away with it last time when you ditched Thatcher, but you can’t pull the same stunt twice.

Neither Major nor any of the other politicians floated as potential leader is a likely winner of the next election; none is even popular. The best bet in last week’s Economist /MORI opinion poll was Michael Heseltine. He, it seems, would have brought about just a 2.5 per cent swing to the Conservatives from Labour (reducing the current adjusted poll split from 55:31 in Labour’s favour to 53:34). Michael Portillo would have meant a 1.5 per cent swing away from the Tories; Gillian Shephard would have produced a 2 per cent negative swing, John Redwood one of 2.5 per cent. In other words, we are talking about marginal changes in voting preferences, which might have made a difference to Tory MPs in marginal con­stituencies (a 1 per cent swing either way amounts to about 20 seats won or lost), but which would have affected only the scale, not the likelihood, of a Labour victory at a general election.

If Redwood’s 89 votes and the 22 abstentions on Tuesday show that more than one-third of Tory MPs have no faith in John Major  – and refused to back him in what was in effect a confidence vote rather than a real leadership election  –  the result also reflects the lack of an electorally credible alternative leader. The scale of the revolt against Major should have been sufficient to prompt his resignation: as NSS argued last week, anything more than a 50-strong rebellion in a de facto vote of confidence for a Prime Minister with a Commons majority in single figures ought to have led to him handing in his notice. That it didn’t (and that there is no demand among Tory MPs for it to do so) reflects a recognition that Major is probably the Tories’ least-worst option to lead them into the next election. It says much about the parlous state of their party that a Prime Minister kneecapped by the third of MPs who refused to back him, limping along at the head of a divided government, is reck­oned a better bet at the polls than any available alternative.

But enough of electability: what of policy? On the surface, the election campaign was fought on the difference between John Major’s steady-as-she-goes brand of consolidatory Toryism and John Redwood’s bright, burning permanent revolution of Thatcherite orthodoxy. Much was made during the leadership campaign of the prospects, in the event of a victory for the right  – either immediately or later  – of a radical change in the theory and practice of Toryism. In reality, where is the difference?

The Thatcherite project, in both its original and its revanchist guise, is founded on four pillars of fundamental­ism: Euro-scepticism (better described as Euro-phobia); anti-statisrn (more accu­rately, anti-state service provision and public spending); economic laissez-faire (except where this interferes with “national” or other vested interests); and social authoritarianism.

Whether one compares Major and Redwood, or Heseltine and Portillo, or any other combination of possible candidates for the Tory leadership, the real differences in terms of the policy they would implement in office between now and the election are relatively minor. After all, these are all people who found it as easy to serve as ministers under Thatcher as Major, and who, with minor exceptions, would be just as happy to do so under any of a variety of potential suc­cessors. The Conservative Party has always been a coalition  – far more so than it sometimes appeared during the 1980s Thatcherite hegemony; and both its left and right wings have always had to trim their programmes to keep that coalition intact and their party in power. What is unique about now is not so much the differences within the party (which were every bit as intense at both the beginning and the end of the Thatcher premiership) as the failure of the party leadership to manage them.

Even on the question of economic and monetary union in Europe the gap is often as much one of rhetoric as reality. It was John Major not Redwood who told BBC’s Breakfast with Frost on Sunday, “I’m not a federalist and I’m not going to lead Britain into a federal Europe”, and that, “There is no possibility whatsoever of all the members of the European Union going forward in 1999 or for years and years and years afterwards, if ever, no possibility at all.” The Tory right may play a rhetorical nationalist card, but the truth is that they are not so far removed from Major in practice; and when it comes to the crunch, any Tory leader would be directed by the underlying economic imperatives  – it was Margaret Thatcher, after all, who signed up to the Single European Act.

On other issues, too, Sunday’s Frost interviews were illuminating. Redwood, reportedly hostile to universal state bene­fits, such as pensions and child benefit, was at pains to say that such reports were “nonsense”. On privatisation he said he was in favour of putting the Post Office into private ownership “but I don’t think it’s possible this parliament”. On tax cuts and public spending he was indetermi­nate. The autumn tax-spending budget may well include what he and his sup­porters seek anyway. The fact is that, regardless of their individual preferences or policy nuances, all of the potential leadership candidates would have been faced by the same objec-tive circumstances on taking office. First, they would have had to keep their party together  – hence no wild lurches to left or right. Just as the Europhobes are now demanding their pound of flesh in return for rallying behind John Major, so too would the left of the party have put the brakes on a Redwood- or Portillo-led party. The requirement for party unity militates against any substantial devia­tion from the course on which the Tory party has been set throughout this parliament.

Second, any leader would have had to have a constant eye on restoring the Tories’ position in the polls. While this might make attractive a touch of populist Euro-bashing and some tax or spending redistributions in favour of doubting Tory voters, we can expect the same sort of thing from Major as might have been produced by his rivals.

Third, and most important, there is the economy. Above all, this determines how much the Tories can give away in pre­-election tax cut sweeteners (see below). Short of a Lawson-like leap into inflationary hyperspace, there is not a lot of room for manoeuvre; Kenneth Clarke’s strategy as Chancellor is the only one available to them. And anyone who seriously believes, with John Redwood, that there is scope for pain-free cuts in public spending (he came up with the highly improbable  – and widely dis­missed  – figure of a £5 billion saving on “waste”) is forgetting the fact that the Thatcher and Major cabinets have spent 16 years failing to find any.

Major’s victory claims  – and the absurdly unquestioning way in which they have been taken at face value by some journalists who ought to know bet­ter  – cannot disguise the fact that noth­ing has really changed. Broadly the same policies will be followed by broadly the same team.

Inside his party, Major’s gambit has helped to coalesce a coherent right opposition, which, for all the warm words on unity earlier this week, will not go away and will continue to cause him trouble. Outside, although the leadership campaign and cabinet reshuffle may give him a short-term poll fillip, he remains the most unpopular prime minister since polling began.

There is a widespread and growing opinion among Tories now that they will lose the next election anyway, so it’s a matter of minimising the scale of the coming defeat and looking towards their route back to power. The experience of Canada’s Progressive Conservatives, who fell from power to holding just two seats in the last general election there, is telling in this light. Norman Lamont told his colleagues on Monday: “The Conserv­ative Party is facing a wipe-out, a Cana­dian-style defeat at the polls. Can we really go on with the kind of leadership we have had in recent years?” Clearly, the majority of his colleagues decided they could  – “for fear of finding something worse”.

The truth is  that behind Lament’s spectre of a Canadian-style wipeout is a growing view among some Tories that even this can now be regarded as acceptable as a means to the reformation of the party as one of the hard right. This is what has happened in Canada, where the formerly centrist Progressive Conservatives have refor­mulated themselves along Thatcherite lines and made an astonishing political comeback, winning control, for example, of Ontario in recent elections. But this could only happen to the British Conserv­ative Party in opposition after a substan­tial election defeat.

That’s the point at which people may really have to begin to care about who leads the Tories.

It’s not the economy, stupid

If theTories’ prospects in the next general election were a matter solely of the performance of the economy, they would have little to worry about. The past couple of years have seen steady growth, low inflation and falling unemployment-and all the signs are that Britain is on a long-term upward trend economically. If the “feel-good” factor is lacking, it is largely because of the depressed state of the housing market and the widespread fear of indebtedness that remains after the collapse of the 1980s house-price boom-and that, ironically, could be anything but a bad thing forthe economy as a whole.

The government’s economic strategy for the next election has been in place since soon after the pound fell out of the exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system in September 1992.The idea, put simply, has been to use tax increases and public spending cuts both to dampen the inflationary pressures likely in any economic recovery (particularly one taking place after a big devaluation) and to reduce government borrowing, while keeping interest rates high enough to check inflation, but low enough not to undermine the recovery. The intention of the past two budgets was to reduce government borrowing to the level at which pre-election cuts in income tax would be feasible.

And that, broadly speaking, is what has happened. Growth is strong and export-led, and inflation is under control, partly because of the state of the housing market, partly because of tax increases, partly because of the weakness of the trade unions. Government borrowing is coming down.And everything points to the Tories being able to cut income tax in the run-up to the general election.

Last week’sTreasury summer economic forecast, which updates and revises the figures in last November’s budget, is admittedly not all good news for the government. Its forecasts of inflation and government borrowing are up on those in the budget, while the estimated growth rate is down. But the differences are small-and in the case of the public sector borrowing requirement almost unimportant because the trend in the next three years is so steeply downward.

The figure for the PSBR for 1995-96 – what the government needs to make up the difference between spending (just over £308 billion) and revenue (nearly £285 billion) – is forecast as £23.6 billion rather than the £21.5 billion estimated last November. The forecast for growth of gross domestic product is 3 per cent not 3.25 per cent, and that for end-of-year inflation 3 per cent instead of 2.5 per cent. Taking into account fiddling the figures, otherwise known as theTreasury’s predilection for pessimism in its prognoses(its growth forecasts this time are particularly gloomy, although some say that this also means that inflation will be higher than it thinks),the economy seems to be more or less on the track the Tories want. As Chancellor Kenneth Clarke put it last week, Britain is “well on the course for tax  cuts” – either this autumn or next year or both.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that the government has much room for manoeuvre. The tax cuts in the pipeline can only be modest – certainly not enough to cancel out the tax increases imposed since 1993 – unless there is either a significant further reduction in public spending, on top of the savage cuts already announced, or an increase in public borrowing. The former would be difficult to achieve without inflicting more severe pain on an electorate that gives every sign of having had enough: even John Redwood’s supporters couldn’t take seriously his proposal for saving £5 billion by cutting down on waste. The latter, unless it were packaged very cleverly, would ata stroke undo the government’s five years hard labour trying to prove to the markets that it would never again take the risks that the then Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, took with inflation in the late 1980s.

In other words, if the Tories want tax cuts – and they are the only thing they have left that resembles an electoral trump card there is no alternative to the strategy that Clarke has been pursuing over the past two years, whether European monetary union is a goal (the PSBR forecasts show that Britain will meet the Maastricht treaty’s convergence criteria on public borrowing in 1996-97) or whether it is ruled out. Labour’s best hope is that the Europe row eclipses this hard truth – not least because its only big difference with Clarke is that it would use the leeway in the public accounts not for tax handouts to ordinary voters but for spending on education, training, infrastructure and tax breaks for long-term investment, none of which has quite the same populist appeal.

The BBC wot done it?

Someone, somehow, managed to nobble the BBC. The coverage that BBC television gave to the result of the Tory leadership election was little short of blatant propaganda for John Major.

BBC2 was the only terrestrial television channel to cover the events of Tuesday afternoon live. At first, it did reasonably well: the chat in the run-up to the result was as competent as any warm, scene-setting flannel for the Trooping of the Colour or Royal Ascot. Then came the announcement – followed, to the shame of all concerned – by the most concentrated, most effective piece of Conservative Central Office puff-broadcasting put out on the television airwaves since the Gulf war.

The BBC had put the unctuous David Dimbleby into the chair for the programme: he proclaimed with a smile that the result of the ballot was a stunning success for Major. The corporation’s chief political correspondent, Robin Oakley, was then used as the sole instant analyst: he described Major’s victory in equally gushing terms. Next came 40 minutes, uninterrupted, of Tories declaring that less than two-thirds of the vote was a tremendous result for Major.

No matter that every newspaper apart from those in the Express stable had reckoned that much less than a 75 per cent vote for Major would be a disaster for the Prime Minister’s credibility – an opinion shared by all but the Major loyalists on the BBC staff. No matter that John Redwood’s vote was much higher than anyone had estimated it would be. And no matter either that the Tory leadership election had left the electorate as a whole stone cold.

By the time Tony Blair came on to say, somewhat ineffectually, that it wasn’t quite as wonderful for Major as Dimbleby, Oakley and Major’s other supporters claimed, the damage had been done. The TV coverage had set the agenda: from then on, everyone else was responding to its euphoric tone.

It is a measure of the dispassionate professionalism of the BBC’s rank-and-file political staff that it took only until the midnight radio news for them to inject some scepticism into the coverage – but even that was too late. Those responsible for the spinning on the Tory side deserve to enjoy at least several magnums of the best champagne: they did their job better than anyone could have expected. But everyone who sucked the Central Office line at the BBC deserves a brickbat.

IS MAJOR FINISHED?

New Statesman & Society leader, 6 May 1995

It would take just 50 Tory MPs to fail to vote for the Prime Minister next Tuesday to make his position untenable

Is John Major finished? We’ll find out next Tuesday, when the Tories’ vote of confidence in his leader­ship takes place. With a majority in the Commons of only eight, his credibility, already in tatters, will be utterly destroyed even if just 50 Tory MPs fail to vote for him. Any more than that would surely be enough to prompt his immediate resignation and a real leadership election contested by the Tories’ heavyweights.

As Ian Aitken argues on page 14, what all the pundits thought last week was a brave gamble by the Prime Min­ister is now looking increasingly like a stupid act of des­peration. This is only partly because of the decision of John Redwood to resign from the cabinet and take on Major in the first round of the leadership contest. Red­wood is, of course, a somewhat more substantial figure than most of the back-bench Europhobes who were being tipped as stalking-horses before he announced his candidacy, and, unlike Norman Lamont, he cannot be easily dismissed as a sour man eager to extract his revenge.

But he is not really a serious challenger for the Tory leadership. He has the charisma of a speak-your-weight machine, and his programme is a mish-mash of discred­ited free-market dogma, xenophobic nationalism and crude authoritarianism – including his backing for the return of the death penalty – that is radically at odds with the mood of the country. His few concessions to the “One Nation” Tory left are superficial and wholly unconvincing. Only a party that had completely taken leave of its senses would consider him less of an electoral liability than Major. Even the Tories are not yet totally barmy.

All the same, Redwood has turned out to be as good a stalking-horse as anyone, and it is by no means unlikely that there will be sufficient votes for him and abstentions next Tuesday to force Major to resign. What then? It is, of course, impossible to tell – and Tory leadership elec­tions have a habit of yielding surprising results. Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Major were favourites for the job when they got it in 1975 and 1990 respectively, and it’s quite feasible that 1995 will follow a similar pattern.

Nevertheless, the smart money has to be on Michael Heseltine emerging from the second round as leader.

He can rely on the support of the pro-Europe left of the party, whose other favourite, Kenneth Clarke, is consid­ered too divisive to become leader; and he has wide­spread support among the large swathe of “unpolitical” Tory MPs who are worried about nothing more than the prospect of losing their seats: alone of the obvious candi­dates, he is considered by his party as a vote-winner. He also has the backing of that part of the Europhobe right that has written off the next election and is prepared to put up with Heseltine’s Europhilia because it reckons that he can be relied upon to resign as soon as he loses the election. At this point, they believe, Michael Portillo or some other right-winger – perhaps Redwood will be a really credible candidate by then – would be a shoo-in as leader of the opposition.

But enough of speculation. Whatever happens, one thing is certain: the Tory party is now in a state of civil war over its policy towards Europe, and there is no sign that any result next Tuesday, or in the second round if there is one, or in November if Major hangs on severely but not mortally wounded, can possibly provide a resolution. There is no leader who can command the confidence of the whole party, no compromise that can be assured of widespread consent. The best that any leader could hope for would be a ceasefire until the next election – but that, as Major himself has discovered in the past year, is some­thing that the Europhobes will not allow.

All of which makes a fascinating spectator sport for journalists and others obsessed with politics, but it leaves the electorate as a whole completely cold. Most people rightly see the Tories’ divisions over Europe as a symp­tom – like sleaze – of political exhaustion. The Tories have, quite simply, been in power too long, and everyone knows it apart from themselves. They might limp along until 1997 under Major or under a new leader – but they cannot regain either their sense of purpose or the sup­port of the electorate that they lost so soon after they lied their way to victory in 1992.

The country does not want the current Tory leader as Prime Minister – and it doesn’t want another Tory leader as Prime Minister. If Major really were brave, he would have done the decent thing – and called an imme­diate general election.

TRIBALISM IN POLITICS

New Statesman & Society leader, 23 June 1995

The scandal of Monklands council in Scotland should teach Labour some lessons about the dangers of slavish loyalty to party

The independent report by Robert Black QC on the Labour council in Monklands in central  Scot­land, published this week, makes depressing reading. Black confirms nearly everything that the local Airdrie and Coatbridge Advertiser alleged more than two years ago about Monklands’ public spending and employment practices. The local Catholic-domi­nated Labour machine – the “Monklands Mafia” –  pumped money into Catholic Coatbridge rather than Protestant Airdrie, systematically hired the relatives of councillors as employees, and gave councillors priority in getting repairs done to their council houses. It is a shabby record of sectarianism and nepotism of which Labour should be ashamed.
Labour has acted decisively in suspending the Monklands Labour group, and shadow Scottish secretary George Robertson’s promise that “anyone in Monklands who has brought the party and with it the local commu­nity into disrepute will have to be brought to account” is wholly welcome.
But this is not the end of the matter. Leaving aside Labour’s behaviour in the early stages of the scandal –  when the local paper broke the story, it was denounced hysterically by the party establishment in Scotland, and the party was slow to act even after it accepted that it had a case to answer – the Monklands affair raises big ques­tions about Labour’s political culture, and not just in Scotland.
Of course, it’s the Scottish angle that is most obvious. If one Labour stronghold in central Scotland is still riven with the sort of religious sectarianism that Labour politi­cians have for years claimed no longer has any purchase except on the football terraces, how many others are in the same state? Monklands suggests that the final victory of secular, class-based politics is still to be achieved.
More generally, Monklands speaks volumes of what can happen when a single party machine dominates local politics for decades without ever being removed from office in an election – and that’s a situation in which Labour finds itself in large swathes of England and Wales as well as in Scotland’s central belt. This is not to say that every council in the country that has been solidly Labour for years is corrupt and nepotistic: contrary to the Tories’ claims this week as they desperately tried to divert attention from the arms-to-Iraq-and-Iran scandals, there’s no evidence to suggest that Monklands was not an extreme case rather than typical. For the most part, Labour local government is remarkably clean, thanks largely to the strong current in British socialism that places the highest values on public service and per­sonal integrity. On the whole, Labour is not the party of shysters on the make.
Nevertheless, there have been enough counter-exam­ples in recent years to make complacency dangerous. And one reason that they exist is that there are strong ele­ments in Labour’s culture that counteract the moral imperatives at the root of British socialism. The most important of these is a streak of almost tribal party chau­vinism, which manifests itself in several ways: a refusal to admit that the worst of Labour might not be better than the best of any other party, unremitting hostility to other political parties and to criticism “from outside”, unques­tioning loyalty to the evidently corrupt and incompetent. The adage “He may be a bastard, but at least he’s our bas­tard” could have been coined to describe one of Labour’s most persistent and unpleasant habits of thought.
Its deleterious effects extend far beyond toleration of local council malpractice, moreover. In the past few weeks, since Tony Blair declared in NSS that he was relaxed about dialogue with other parties of the centre-left, Labour’s numbskull chauvinist tendency has spent an inordinate amount of time and energy denouncing Paddy Ashdown and his party.
No matter that there are few significant policy differ­ences between Labour and the Lib Dems (and that, where there are, the Lib Dems are often more radical); no matter either that Labour might need support to form a govern­ment after the next election: the Lib Dems are not Labour, so they must be the enemy! This “reasoning”, which of course has its equivalent among some Lib Dems, will undoubtedly get more of an airing as the two centre-left parties slug it out in the by-election in Littleborough and Saddleworth by-election, which both think they can win from the Tories. It’s almost tempting to argue for tactical voting for the Tories to knock a little sense about coopera­tion into the party chauvinists’ heads.

THE ARMS SALES SCANDAL

New Statesman & Society leader, 16 June 1995
Michael Heseltine has struck a welcome blow for Lord Justice Scott’s inquiry into arms sales to Iraq
“I was not briefed on this contract at any time during my non-executive directorship,” Chief Secretary to the Treasury Jonathan Aitken told the House of Commons in March after docu­mentation emerged proving incontrovertibly that BMARC, an arms company of which he was a director, had in the late 19805 sold naval guns to Iran, exporting them via Singapore to get round the government’s ban on arms sales to Iran or Iraq. The exercise was code-named “Project Lisi” by the company, and it was dis­cussed at board meetings at which Aitken was present. “Seven years after the event,” he said in March, “I have no recollection of ever having heard about Project Lisi or read about it in company reports.”
This week, it became clear that, even if Aitken knew nothing, the British intelligence services knew plenty. President of the Board of Trade Michael Heseltine stunned the Commons by announcing that, as early as 1986,  “intelligence was obtained” that Oerlikon, BMARC’s Swiss parent company until BMARC was sold to the British firm Astra in 1988, had concluded a con­tract with Iran. “The intelligence picture developed in 1987, when it was revealed that naval guns made by Oer­likon had been offered to Iran by a company in Singa­pore. In July and September 1988, two intelligence reports rounded out the picture by referring to naval guns and ammunition being supplied by Oerlikon through Singapore to Iran.”
And yet BMARC continued to be granted permission by the Department of Trade and Industry to export guns to Singapore. The intelligence reports were apparently not passed on to the DTI, and even if they had been it’s a moot point whether anyone would have taken any notice. The DTI Export Licensing Department was in the habit of granting military export licences without full documentation. Between 1986 and 1989, said Hesel­tine, 74 per cent of military export licences were granted without all the relevant papers being presented.
Aitken is sticking to the line that he knew nothing about Project Lisi, which, although even less credible than it was in March, is hardly surprising. Whether it saves his skin is another matter entirely. The chief secretary cannot escape the foul stench of dishonesty and graft that clings to him, and both he and his loyal colleagues know that it will not take many more revelations for his political career deservedly to be cut short.
But this is only a small part of the story. Far more important than the impact of Heseltine’s statement on the fate of Aitken is its devastating effect on the attempt by several prominent Tories to rubbish Lord Justice Scott’s inquiry on the sale of arms to Iraq. The clear impli­cation of Heseltine’s announcement that three-quarters of military export licences were granted without proper documentation is that there was a policy in the late 1980s of allowing just about anything to be sold to just about anyone – regardless of formal restrictions either secret or publicised. It is difficult to think of a more effective way of silencing those Tory politicians who have seized on the occasion of a couple of pre-publication leaks of Scott’s long-delayed report to bleat about the unfairness of the inquiry procedures and to claim that Scott had exceeded his brief. After Heseltine’s statement this week, the problem seems to be that, in concentrating just on Iraq, he has not cast his net widely enough. Indeed, we need nothing short of a full-scale independent public inquiry into the whole of Britain’s arms export business.
Of course, Heseltine has his own reasons to give Scott a boost. Alone among senior Tories in the current govern­ment, he has nothing to lose over the arms-to-Iraq affair. Unlike John Major and Douglas Hurd, he cannot have his competence or integrity called into question over his handling of exports to Iraq in the late 1980s: he was out of government at the time. And unlike Kenneth Clarke, he participated only unwillingly in the bodged cover-up of issuing Public Interest Immunity certificates to prevent a fair trial of the defendants in the Matrix-Churchill case.
But even if Heseltine is using the arms sales scandal in his campaign to seize the keys of Number Ten in the autumn, we should be grateful for his intervention. The attempt of the guilty men – notably William Waldegrave and Geoffrey Howe – to cast aspersions on Scott’s meth­ods and competence has been shameful. Any blow against their cynicism has to be welcome, even if it is delivered from the basest of motives.

SAFETY FIRST?

New Statesman & Society, 9 June 1995

Contrary to chancellor Kenneth Clarke’s claims, there’s a world of difference between the Tories and Labour on the big issues of economic policy, shadow chancellor Gordon Brown tells Paul Anderson
Shadow chancellor Cordon Brown is in a happy, bullish mood  – and that, for him, is unusual, at least if you believe the Fleet Street con­sensus. Brown attracts the whole gamut of disapproving adjectives from journal­ists: glum, cagey, humourless, dour, cau­tious, workaholic to the point of driving his staff nuts. He talks in soundbites, they say. He doesn’t make jokes. Worst of all, he never mentions his personal life.
A couple of years ago, the caricature seemed cruel but almost apposite. I inter­viewed Brown at length just before Christmas 1992, after the debacle of Britain’s withdrawal from the exchange rate mechanism of the European Mone­tary System. Then, he came across as a man besieged in a bunker  – and in many ways he was. Labour’s Eurosceptic ten­dency, led by Bryan Gould, had revolted publicly over his backing for British membership of the ERM and his refusal to endorse devaluation: three months after the event and six months into his occupancy of the shadow chancellorship, he still had to be pressed to admit that, if Labour had been elected the previous spring, the new government would have devalued the pound as soon as it took office (albeit within the ERM). Brown wasn’t exactly downcast, but he was any­thing but relaxed. If he knew what he wanted, he also knew that it would be a long, friendless struggle to get it  – and he was right. The next year saw Brown sub­jected to near constant attackfrom the left and the unions. In autumn 1993, he just scraped on to Labour’s National Execu­tive Committee.
Now, however, as he leans back in his chair in his Westminster office, Brown seems a lot less anxious. He still talks in soundbites  – there’s no other politician in Britain today who comes up so consis­tently in conversation with the phrases he uses in his speeches  – but the joins don’t show as they once did. He is still just as serious, and he is still just as careful. But he smiles at awkward questions and shrugs off criticism. Gordon Brown, although he’d never admit it publicly, is a man who thinks his time has come.
It’s easy to see why. After the trials and tribulations of his first two years as shadow chancellor, things at long last seem to be going his way. Labour is not only well ahead in the opinion polls but has overtaken the Tories in ratings for economic competence. Brown’s populist crusade against the excess pay and perks of privatised utility bosses has struck a chord with both his party and the public at large. And, particularly since Tony Blair’s victory on Clause Four, left-wing critics of the leadership line on economic policy seem to have melted away. The only people to have had a go at Brown’s string of policy speeches in the past few weeks have been newspaper columnists.
“The principal reason for our defeat in 1992 was our failure to convince people on economic policy,” says Brown. “No matter what the truth was, we were seen by the public as the party that would tax for its own sake and spend wastefully, we were caricatured as the party that would take the soft option on devaluation and give in to special interests. Since then, we’ve pursued a strategy that hasn’t made me popular with some people at some times. But it’s now the Conservatives who are seen as the party that has taxed unfairly and spent wastefully and ineffi­ciently, on unemployment in particular, the party that has devalued and has repre­sented special interests, particularly with the privatised utilities. Labour is now seen as speaking for the public, as the party of economic competence as well as social justice. We’ve got a clear analysis of the economy, clear prescriptions. They are different from what we were saying 16 years ago. But the world has changed.”
There are those who believe that Brown has taken more from the Tories than their reputation for competence, and that the differences between the two parties on the broad questions of policy are now minimal. If his critics in the Labour Party have been quiet of late, their worries were given voice by Chancellor Kenneth Clarke the week before last, when he declared: “I must be the first Chancellor
who has a shadow chancellor who is not criticising what I am doing. Gordon Brown’s problem is he thinks what I am doing is working. He has not for some for time opposed anything I have done.”  
Brown is contemptuous of the accusation that he has adopted the Tory approach. “We start from a wholly differ­ent analysis from the Conservatives’ of what is wrong with the British economy. We believe that it simply doesn’t have the capacity to sustain the levels of growth, of living standards, of public services that we want. That’s a product of 16 years of a government with a wholly wrong philos­ophy. If the Tories take on our agenda, it’s a recognition that the political argument is moving in our direction. But for them to become believers in intervention for industry, skills, training and education will make them look like tourists in a for­eign country with a phrasebook they don’t properly understand.”
Labour’s promise to be “tough on infla­tion, tough on the causes of inflation” does not indicate an acceptance of the Tories’ priorities, he insists. “We’ve got an understanding of the causes of infla­tion and they haven’t. The cause of infla­tion is the same as the cause of high levels of unemployment: the limited capacity of the economy. Every time the economy expands, it runs into skills shortages and technology bottlenecks, and the result is inflationary pressures. Labour will be tougher on the causes of inflation than the Conservatives because we under­stand its causes. And it’s right that we should be tough. The war against infla­tion is a Labour war. It affects pensioners and those with savings, it damages investment and therefore jobs. The idea that Labour should be less tough on infla­tion is wrong.”
Similarly, “the Labour Party is not the party of devaluation: the Conservative Party is. The value of the pound against the Deutschmark has halved since 1979. Britain had to devalue in 1992 because of the Tories’ failure. Labour is not the party of the soft option.”
This stance is underlined by the com­mitments in the draft of Labour’s new macro-economic policy document, A New Economic Future for Britain, which goes to the party’s National Policy Com­mission this weekend and, suitably amended, will then be adopted by the Labour conference in the autumn. It states that “Labour’s economic objective is to deliver the highest possible level of sustainable growth consistent with low and stable inflation”, promising “an inflation target alongside a medium-term target for the trend rate of economic growth”. Labour will “eschew short-term, quick-fix, tax-spend-and-borrow solutions”: in particular, it will not bor­row to finance consumption and will “keep the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product stable at an appropriate and prudent level”.
Brown insists that this does not mean business as usual. The policy document includes the objective of meeting “the 1944 white paper commitment to achieve high and stable levels of employment”, he points out, and he is certain that a mixture of supply-side measures to encourage employment growth and a new emphasis on the long term in eco­nomic policy will deliver the goods. The document also explicitly backs moves towards European monetary union.
Brown won’t be drawn on the timetable for EMU  – “We’ve got to wait and see how things develop”  – and rehearses Labour’s familiar insistence on tougher pre-EMU convergence criteria and greater political accountability for the European central bank, but he is unashamedly enthusiastic about Europe: “The idea that Britain should distance itself from Europe is simply not credible. We ought to be leaders in Europe.” He points proudly to the proposal in the new document for the creation of a “new Euro­pean growth fund that would be explicitly countercyclical, that could run with a sur­plus during a period of recovery and run in deficit if necessary in a recession”. If Keynesianism in one country is no longer feasible, it seems that there is still room for it on a continental level.
What’s missing in all this, of course, is the detailed tax, spending and borrowing plans that Labour will put before the voters at the next election. The sort of budget measures Labour would intro­duce are familiar from the party’s sugges­tions at budget time in the past couple of years: bigger tax breaks for investment and more spending on education and training, paid for by tightening up on tax evasion and introducing a windfall tax on privatised utility profits. But, aware of the problems Labour faced in 1992, when it fought an election in the middle of a recession on policies decided at the height of a boom, Brown won’t even promise that his budget proposals from 1994 will find their way into the manifesto.
“It would be irresponsible to make promises two years before an election when we don’t know what the economic circumstances will be at the time,” he says bluntly.” I assure you that we are not going to hide what we’re planning to do. But we will make our decisions on spend­ing and taxation and so on at the appropri­ate time.” If Brown has reason to be pleased with the way things have turned out so far, it’s impossible to avoid the con­clusion that the most difficult part is still to come.

NO UN PULL OUT FROM BOSNIA

New Statesman & Society leader, 2 June 1995
  
The UN must stay in Bosnia – but in the long term the answer to Radovan Karadzic is to let the Bosnian government have the arms to kick him out
The hostage crisis in Serb-occupied Bosnia has been waiting to happen since the very start of the deployment of United Nations forces to escort aid convoys in 1992.
From the beginning, the UN troops have been peace­keepers in a war zone. They have had to rely on the good will of the combatants to go about their business, and the enemies of the Bosnian government  –  initially both Croats and Serbs, since 1994 the Serbs  –  have used this to further their own interests. Aid convoys have been held up and pillaged, UN troops have been messed around and humiliated. It was always likely that, if Bosn­ian government forces started to gain military advantage or it seemed that the international community was plan­ning to intervene on the government side, the Serbs would take a desperate course of action. Which is pre­cisely what has now happened.
In the past few months, the military tide has turned against the Serb aggressors in Bosnia. Radovan Karadzic’s brutal Bosnian Serb regime is beginning to crumble both economically and militarily. The Bosnian Serb troops retain the superiority in heavy weapons, which they inherited from the arsenal of the Yugoslav army, and which allowed them to seize 70 per cent of Bosnia in the first place. But that superiority is declining as the gov­ernment finds ways of evading the arms embargo imposed by the UN “on all sides”, which came close to crippling Bosnian resistance to Serb expansionism.
To make matters worse, the dictator of Serbia proper, Slobodan Milosevic, decided last year that he had more to gain from the removal of sanctions on Serbia itself than from continuing to back Karadzic’s refusal to make even the small territorial concessions demanded by the Con­tact Group plan for carving up Bosnia (to dignify it with the title of “peace plan” would be a travesty) .
Milosevic retains his dream of a Greater Serbia: contrary to what the British Foreign Office and others would have us believe, he has not suddenly changed into a dove and should on no account be encouraged, let alone trusted. But from Karadzic’s point of view it appears that he has joined the ranks of the enemies of the “Republica Sprska”. Since Milosevic started trying to bully him into accepting the Contact Group plan, Karadzic has felt that the whole world is conspiring against him.
Hence, after Nato aircraft struck last week against Serb military targets in a belated response to continued mur­derous artillery attacks by Karadzic’s forces on unpro­tected civilians in Bosnian government enclaves, the Bosnian Serbs upped the ante, seizing hundreds of UN troops as hostages. In response, the Contact Group powers rushed further troops into Bosnia. As NSS went to press, each side was waiting for the other to blink.
The dangers in this stand-off are multiple – but, con­trary to the populist chorus in the Commons on Wednes­day, the greatest of them is not what might happen to the troops being held by Karadzic’s forces. Worrying as their predicament is for them and their families, it is less so than the prospects for Sarajevo and the Bosnian govern­ment enclaves in eastern Bosnia if the UN troops are withdrawn. Unless Karadzic is more stupid than he has so far appeared to be, the hostages will come to no harm. The same, however, cannot be said of Sarajevo and the defenceless communities of eastern Bosnia, which will be destroyed by Karadzic’s thugs if the UN pulls out. It is essential that the reinforcements sent this week are used to protect the Bosnian enclaves, not to facilitate UN with­drawal from Serb-occupied Bosnia.
But that can only be for the short-term. Critics of the UN deployments are right to argue that the international community cannot go on forever running food and other essential supplies into the besieged towns. Somehow, the sieges must be lifted and the besieged towns allowed to return to a normal peaceful existence.
The question is how. Karadzic and his cronies have this week shown just how naive were all those diplomats, from Lord Carrington on, who thought that the way to secure peace in Bosnia was to divide it on ethnic grounds, with Karadzic controlling the majority of territory. Never has it been clearer that the answer is to give the Bosnian government the tools and let it finish the job. Who cares if it upsets the Russians – it’s way past time to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government.

WILSON’S LEGACY

New Statesman & Society leader, 26 May 1991
Tony Blair appears to have learned the bits of Harold Wilson he needs to emulate. But does he know what he should not copy in power?
The death of Harold Wilson this week has prompted a flood of commentary on his legacy to British politics – and that is hardly surprising. Although, as a result of illness, Wilson was not an active player for the last decade ofhis life, his contribu­tion to British politics in the 30 years immediately after the second world war was immense.
Consider the  achievements. He won four elections out of five he fought as Labour leader – and he would have won the fifth, in 1970, but for a combination of bad luck, the political naivety of chancellor Roy Jenkins and, it has to be said, a dulling of his own political instincts, brought on in part by several years of vicious party in-fighting. His first election victory, in 1964, saw Labour winning an absolute majority in the Commons, ending 13 years of Tory rule – the first and only time since 1906 that an opposition party has won such a majority against a Con­servative administration. Today, after 16 years that have seen four consecutive Tory general election victories, this appears even more remarkable than it did at the time. Then there was the revolution in social legislation in the 19605 – on abortion, homosexuality, divorce and reduction of the voting age – and the massive expansion of educational opportunities achieved between 1966 and 1970 (including the creation of the Open University, very much the brainchild of Wilson and his arts minister, Jen­nie Lee).
Even on the economic front, once the huge psychologi­cal hurdle of devaluation had been cleared, the record of the 19605 Labour government is remarkably good: the best sustained growth of any period since the war, and the transformation of the balance of payments and the budget deficit. Edward Heath was handed the most favourable set of economic circumstances of any incom­ing prime minister this century. In short, the first Wil­son administration bears comparison with the great reforming Labour government of 1945-51.
And yet, for all this – and despite the warm glow of nos­talgia with which the British view the 19605 – Wilson’s reputation has languished. It is only recently that there has been anything of a revival as time begins to lend some objectivity to assesments  of his record.
Some of that is down to the persistence of baseless smears about his private life and his alleged sympathies with the Soviet Union, put about by paranoiacs on the far right throughout his period in office. But Wilson hardly helped matters with his dubious choice of friends – to some of whom he gave peerages and knighthoods – and by his endless opportunist wheeling and dealing on everything from Vietnam and Rhodesia to trade union policy and nuclear weapons. Even – particularly –  among those on the left who admire his abilities as a pop­ulist electoral politician, there are few who defend the way in which he governed.
In the run-up to the 1992 general election, when Labour was well ahead in the opinion polls, the Tories toyed seriously with the idea of casting Neil Kinnock as a latter-day Wilson in their election propaganda – vigor­ous, attractive and even effective in opposition, but a cer­tain slave to prevarication, procrastination and unprinci­pled compromise in office. In the end, the plan was shelved, partly because Kinnock stopped looking quite as dangerous, but largely because the Tories discovered that many voters didn’t know why they were supposed to be afraid of a new Wilson.
Three years on, memories of the Wilson years are still hazier – yet Tony Blair looks and sounds more like the Wilson of 1963 than Kinnock ever did, right down to the rhetoric of modernity at the core ofhis political message. Blair appears to have learned the bits of Wilson that he needs to emulate. The big unanswered question is whether he knows what he should not try to copy when he gets to Number Ten.

LIB-LABBERY RULES OK

New Statesman & Society leader, 12 May 1995
  
Last week’s local elections were great for both main opposition parties – and now they should be thinking seriously about cooperation
Last week’s rout of the Tories in the district elec­tions in England and Wales was phenomenal. As Rob Waller writes on page 8, the Conservative result was the worst on record. Although it would be foolish to conclude that the Tories can’t recover before the next general election, with or without John Major their prospects of victory are slim. Even if they make a substantial recovery in the opinion polls, the collapse of their base in local government will severely hamper their ability to run effective campaigns in much of the country. The Tories’ dire performance is not the only notable feature of the local elections: both Labour and the Liberal Democrats did extraordinarily well. Labour’s share of the vote, 47 per cent, was the highest it has received in a national election since 1966. The party made dramatic gains throughout the land, even in those parts of the south-east and East Anglia where it almost disappeared as a political force in the 19703 and 19805. John Prescott had good reason to crack open the champagne at Labour headquarters in the early hours of last Friday morning.
But the Lib Dems have even better reason to celebrate. In the past couple of years, particularly since the election of Tony Blair as Labour leader, most commentators have written off the Lib Dems as a force in national politics. Paddy Ashdown’s party might be capable of pulling off the occasional parliamentary by-election victory, the argument went, and it will remain in control of councils and continue to hold parliamentary seats in its south-­western and Celtic redoubts. But its days of expansion are over: Labour is the only centre-left party worth watching.
Last Thursday knocked that one for six. The Lib Dems gained nearly 500 seats and took control of 14 more coun­cils, taking 23 per cent of the vote nationwide, far better than their current opinion poll standing. They advanced not just in the south-west but in the south-east and East Anglia. Of course, translating local votes into support in a general election is easier said than done, but if the Lib Dems can keep up the momentum, they are well placed to make substantial gains in the House of Commons.
As NSS has said time and again, this is no bad thing for Labour. However well Labour has been doing under Blair in the south-east and East Anglia, it is a credible challenger to sitting Tory MPs only in a few seats in these regions: in most of the south, Lib Dems have the better chance of replacing Tories. Given that Labour cannot be sure of an overall majority in the Commons, it should at least welcome Lib Dem successes because they herald the possibility of a Lib-Lab parliamentary majority if Labour doesn’t make it alone.
But signs of Lib Dem health are not merely good for Labour on grounds of realpolitik. Despite Tony Blair’s declarations of his dislike for the “tribal attitude to left-of-centre politics”, too many in the Labour Party remain party chauvinists who are uneasy with the idea of plural­ism: a Liberal Democrat Party that Labour cannot ignore forces them to rethink Labour’s political culture. More important, there are many key areas of policy where Lib Dem thinking is far more radical than Labour’s: electoral reform, the environment, Europe, civil liberties. Rather than dragging Labour to the right, the introduction of Lib Dems to a Labour government would these days give it much-needed reforming impetus.
For all these reasons, NSS gives a warm welcome to the formation of the Labour Initiative on Cooperation (Linc), launched this week by a group of Labour politicians and intellectuals who would like to foster friendship between Britain’s two parties of the centre-left. Its first step, the publication of a pamphlet outlining the ways that Labour and the Lib Dems have worked together in local govern­ment, is modest enough – but there are grounds for believing that its way of thinking will find plenty of supporters. Blair has made it clear that he is relaxed about Lib-Lab discussion, and the whole process will be given a major boost if Ashdown declares, as expected, that he intends to abandon the stance of “equidistance” between Labour and Tories that his party has held since its incep­tion. Traditionalists in both parties will moan that any reduction of hostilities is a betrayal, but they will have few grounds for complaint in the absence of formal pre­-election pacts, which no one is now advocating. As last week’s results showed, the voters don’t even need prompting by party leaders to know that it makes sense to vote tactically.

BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO

New Statesman & Society, 4 May 1995

Will Tony Blair do anything significant to change his party’s relationship with the trade unions before the next general election? Paul Anderson has his doubts
“Change and modernisation doesn’t stop at four o’clock this afternoon,” declared Tony Blair at last Saturday’s conference to change Clause Four of the Labour constitution. “It goes on – in the development of the party, in the development of policy.”
His remarks were widely interpreted as indicating an intention to transform Labour’s relations with the trade unions – and at first sight it’s not difficult to see why. Nine out often individual Labour Party members who had been given the chance to vote had opted for the new Clause Four, and the only union to ballot, the Communications Workers Union, had voted for change by a similar margin. But two of the largest unions, the TGWU and Unison, had stuck to deci­sions to oppose the new Clause Four made after consultations with activists.
Blair was obviously disappointed that these unions had not changed their minds at the last minute – and it only took a little off-the-record briefing from sources generally believed to be close to the Labour leader to convince many com­mentators that a radical shake-up of Labour-union relations is on the way.
It might be, of course – but it’s far more likely that Blair will decide not to launch himself into forcing through sig­nificant modifications of the party consti­tution this side of a general election. The one change that is almost certain, partic­ularly now that it has the backing of deputy leader John Prescott, is a reduc­tion of the union vote at party conference from the current 70 per cent to 50 per cent – but Labour conference in 1993 more-or-less agreed to make this reduc­tion when individual party membership reached 300,000 (see below).
Although there is undoubtedly some scope for unions to argue that Blair is moving too fast on this, the indications are that he will get his way in time for the 1996 conference. GMB general secretary John Edmonds told NSS this week that he has no problem with the reduction, and his thinking is echoed elsewhere in the upper echelons of the unions.
Although symbolically important, reducing the union vote will not make a lot of difference to the way that the confer­ence operates: the big unions will con­tinue to get their way on the overwhelm­ing majority of conference business. Ironically, the more prescient of them believe that the reduction will increase the legitimacy of their participation.
Beyond this, there are two possibilities being given an airing. The first is that Blair will push for a change in the compo­sition of Labour’s National Executive Committee: he told the Guardian this week that he would “like to see a broader NEC, with local government members, and a greater role for the way in which ordinary members of the party are involved in policy-making through policy forums”. But even this is far from certain: he said in the same interview that he did not have a blueprint for NEC reform and went out of his way to deny that he wanted to reduce union representation on the NEC. There is obviously quite a lot of drafting work to be done if the composi­tion of the NEC is to be changed at this year’s party conference, practically the last chance for it before the election.
The second possibility is some rule change to ensure that unions ballot members on certain Labour Party mat­ters – a simple enough idea in theory, but likely to meet serious union resis­tance if the leadership tries to push it through. One reason is that the unions resent the criticism of their representa­tive democratic structures implied by the argument that only ballots can give them a legitimate voice in Labour affairs, a point made forcefully last weekend by Rodney Bickerstaffe of Unison. Almost as important is the cost to a union of bal­loting all members (£500,000 for the TGWU). If Blair proposes the introduc­tion of ballots for anything other than fundamental changes to the party consti­tution, he will find it extremely difficult to get through conference.
Other reforms to the Labour-union link are even more unlikely – and in any case, Blair has more important tasks in the next six months than messing with the party constitution. An economic pol­icy is due to be presented to Labour’s National Policy Forum in June, and there’s a serious argument to be had over what it should contain, with the unions pressing hard for commitments on reducing unemployment and on the level at which a Labour government would set a national minimum wage. It is more than possible that the leadership will get its way on economic policy – but its chances will be reduced if it tries to force through constitutional change against the unions’ will at the same time.
Then there’s the small problem of money – in particular the war chest for the next election (see box). Unless Blair is a reckless gambler, he’ll put off trying to change anything significant about the Labour-union link until well after the next election – and by then, the unions hope, he should have more important things on his mind.

THE SMALL PROBLEM OF MONEY

One reason Labour is unlikely to break its links with the trade unions is its reliance on them for cash.

Trade union donations comprise more than half the party’s income nationally in a non-election year (£4.7 million out of a total of £8.8 million income in 1993, the last year for which figures are available, came from affiliated organisations) and the unions have pledged large sums for the party’s general election war-chest. The unions also contribute generously to local Labour parties and towards MPs’ research and administration costs.

Although Labour’s membership has increased in the past year, many of the new members are paying subscriptions at reduced rates(some of them so low that it costs more to service them than they pay in subs).The party’s income from corporate donors is minuscule.

So, despite the success that the party had in securing donations from individuals in the run-up to the 1992 general election (more than £2 million came in, mostly in small donations, during the election campaign), no one in the party believes that it could fight the next general election campaign without union support – although afterwards, if it wins the election, it could reduce its reliance on the unions by introducing state funding of political parties. The problem here, however, is that a subsequent Tory government could abandon state funding – and if Labour had by then alienated the unions, it could find itself in a financial crisis worse than anything it has seen in the past 15 years. 

       
 REFORMING THE UNION LINK: THE OPTIONS

All but one of the elements of the Labour-union relationship would be difficult to change

The role of the trade unions in Labour’s constitution has changed in recent years – but it remains crucial to the operation of the party at every level. There are four key areas where the unions play critical constitutional roles: the annual party conference, the National Executive Committee, constituency Labour parties and leadership elections.

Party conference The union role at Labour’s annual conference was modified by rule changes in 1993.The unions now have 70 per cent of the vote at party conference (as against 30 per cent for CLPs) and each union may, if it wishes, split its share of votes instead of wielding it as a block(although few do). According to the rules laid down in 1993: “The balance of voting between the two sections shall be reviewed by the National Executive Committee and annual conference once individual membership exceeds 300,000, with a view to changing the balance in favour of constituency parties provided that such adjustment does not reduce the proportion of the total vote cast by affiliated organisations to less than 50 per cent.”

Tony Blair seemed to interpret this as meaning that, now that membership has reached the 300,000 threshold, the union share of the vote at this year’s conference could be reduced to 50 per cent by a meeting of the NEC in the next couple of months: most others reckon that the rule implies that conference needs to approve the change before it happens (which would mean it could not take effect until the 1996 conference). Still others argue that the NEC should recommend not an immediate reduction to 50 per cent, but a phased reduction. How vigorous the argument about the interpretation of the rules will be is difficult to judge, but few believe that either the left or the trade unions will put up much of a fight if Blair insists on a rapid reduction to 50 per cent. No other reforms of the union role at conference have so far been suggested.

National Executive Committee Probably the most important role that unions have in Labour’s organisation is in the National Executive Committee (NEC), the body, 25-strong apart from the leader and deputy leader, that is responsible for the day-to-day running of the party and supervision of its policy-making. Through their membership of the NEC, trade unions are represented on all the party’s policy-making bodies: the domestic and international policy committee, the six NEC-shadow cabinet joint policy commissions and the National Policy Forum.

Twelve NEC seats are reserved for the trade unions: they are chosen by union votes at party conference (invariably after a little behind-the-scenes fixing). The unions also effectively determine who sits in the five-member women’s section of the NEC through their votes at conference. The unions have no influence over the election of the seven members chosen by constituency Labour parties or the single member chosen by affiliated socialist societies.

Proposals for changing the composition of the NEC have been recurrent, and have come from many different directions. In recent years, feminists and the left have argued that the women’s section should be elected by the Labour women’s conference, while Labour councillors have made the case for their own section of the NEC.

The problem with NEC reform for the leadership is simple: the massive union representation and the role of the unions in electing the women’s section act as a counterbalance to the constituency section whenever the latter shifts to the left (as it did from the mid-1970s until the mid- 1980s), and a simple reduction in the union role now could exacerbate tensions between party and government if the next Labour government loses popularity among ordinary party members. This problem might be overcome if reduction in the union presence on the NEC were compensated for by the introduction of a section for councillors and perhaps one for MPs and MEPs – but reform along these lines might create an unmanageably large committee or massive resentment among the unions or both.

Constituency Labour parties At the local level, trade unions affiliate to constituency Labour parties(CLPs), which allows their members to join at a reduced rate, gives them representation (up to a maximum of five delegates) on the constituency party’s general committee (GC), and allows them the right to nominate candidates in parliamentary selections. The GC handles everyday management of the CLP, can submit resolutions to annual conference, elects a CLP’s officers (including delegates to annual conference) and draws up shortlists in parliamentary selections. Before the introduction of one member, one vote for parliamentary selections and leadership elections, the GC also decided the CLP’s choice of putative MP and leader.

There have been no firm proposals from the Labour leadership for radical changes in the union role at CLP level-not least because, despite the recent increase in Labour Party membership, many local parties are too small to function without the participation of union delegates on the GC. There is some pressure for the extension of OMOV to the election of delegates to party conference, and there have always been complaints that the union delegate system is abused by political factions of left and right: the criterion for a union to have the right to representation on a CLP’s GC is merely that it has members registered in a particular constituency. How exactly such abuse could be stopped is difficult to workout unless union representation on GCs were to be removed entirely.

Leadership elections The role of the unions in Labour leadership elections was drastically reduced after uproar over the way that big union leaders announced their support for John Smith as leader after the 1992 general election. Under the system introduced by rule changes in 1993, Labour’s leader and deputy leader are elected by a three-section electoral college(comprising Labour MPs and MEPs, individual party members and affiliated unions and other organisations), with each section apportioned a third of the total vote and each section voting on a one person, one vote basis. It is extremely unlikely that any proposals for changing this system will emerge in the foreseeable future – not least because the Labour Party constitution forbids returning to constitutional changes for three years after they are approved except in emergencies.